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Ordover: The Use of Written Direct Testimony in Jury Trials: A Proposal

THE USE OF WRITTEN DIRECT TESTIMONY IN
JURY TRIALS: A PROPOSAL
Abraham P. Ordover*
The trial court is an escape valve for the excessive heat generated by conflicts within the society. Its role is to resolve disputes
pursuant to procedures calculated to permit a full and fair hearing to the litigants. It is widely known among members of the bar
that a lawsuit is not a scientific investigation for the discovery of
truth.' Rather, it is a mechanism by which society seeks to resolve
the disputes which arise between or among its members and/or
institutions.2 The litigants frame the issues and determine the
matters to be studied. They marshall their own evidence and
present only those facts which are of immediate moment and
persuasive significance in the context of their case. Ordinarily, no
search for broader truths is either attempted or permitted in this
forum. 3
Although truth may be beyond the litigator's grasp, reasonably just settlements of disputes are not. At trial, such resolutions
are left to the trier of fact. They depend upon the facts presented
and the clarity and persuasiveness of the presentation. It is here
that the process frequently comes apart, for the traditional modes
of presentation of facts in our trial courts are inappropriate in
many modern disputes.
Litigation in the trial courts is a reflection of the society from
which the conflict originates. Our society is monstrously technical
and produces rather complicated disagreements. The mere mention of terms such as antitrust or products liability, or any of a
host of scientific phrases or technical words of art concerning
anything and everything from atomic physics to automotive parts
is enough to activate a blank stare in all of us save one who
* B.A. Syracuse University, 1958; J.D. Yale University, 1961; Associate Professor of
Law, Hofstra University School of Law.
1. Exceptions to this expansive view are most frequently found when courts seek to
alter judicial notice of "legislative facts." See, e.g., Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Hmv. L. REv. 364 (1942); C. McCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EvmaIDcE § 331 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McComicK].
For the most part this practice occurs in appellate courts, as seen in cases like Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. It has also been characterized as "[a] competition of inconsistent versions of facts
and theories of law." R. KEEON, TaRA TACTIcs AND M rrHODS xi (1973) [hereinafter cited

as KEEroN].
3. Id. at 319.
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happens to be an expert in that minute area of human concern
to which the word or expression may have meaning.
We are a society of experts. We are beset by them and are
ourselves the besetters, depending upon the particular matter
at issue. We are a mass society in which change is a constant,
turmoil the normal way of things, and complexity an unpleasant
by-product. When a conflict arrives in court it is usually a complicated affair requiring the use of expert testimony for an understanding of the facts at issue.4
Unfortunately, the procedures which we employ in our trial
courts are poorly suited to the presentation of scientific, technical, or even complex facts. 5 These procedures have evolved to a
state where they are uniquely geared to the convenience of counsel and not to the enlightenment of the judge and jury. This can
readily be seen by an almost religious cleaving to the question and
answer method of direct interrogation. In order to preserve the
opportunity to object, we have foregone the lucidity of the direct
narrative presentation.6 In the case of the expert witness or even
the complicated fact witness, all too often the result is a baffled
jury. In the guise of insulating the jury from objectionable matter
we instead succeed in insulating it from the facts.
If the jury is to understand the facts of a convoluted trial, a
different method of presenting direct testimony must be employed. Such a presentation must place emphasis on clarity. It
must preserve the right of counsel for legitimate objection while
removing those which are merely captious and wasteful. It should
eliminate the propensity of some attorneys toward gamesmanship. It must provide an expanded opportunity for crossexamination and persuasive argumentation. A premium must be
placed on putting the facts before the jury in a comprehensible
manner.
The proposal which follows calls for the utilization of written
narrative direct testimony in appropriate jury cases. These would
include cases involving a substantial degree of sophisticated,
technical evidence. Resistance to the introduction of written evidence is largely based upon traditional adversary concepts of jury
4. MCCORMICK §§ 13-17; 2 J. WIGMORE, A TR ATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
5. See 3 WIGMORE § 767.
6. See, e.g., LEVIN & CRAMER, TRIAL ADVOCACY 129 (1968); KEETON 321.
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trials and the hypertechnical forms of objections which have
evolved to "protect" the jury within this framework. The aim of
this proposal is to place factual exposition at the forefront of trial
considerations while protecting the jury both from "tainted" evidence and from ourselves.
The use of written testimony demands rethinking in a number of areas including scope of discovery, trial preparation, the
relationship of counsel to witness, the role of the court and, certainly not least, the application of some of the technical rules of
evidence at trial. While reanalysis is always painful, it is immeasurably more painful to participate in a tangled trial where the
jury is befuddled by the evidence largely because our forms result
7
in a clumsy presentation.

I. THE PROPOSAL
A. Method of Operation
(1) The trial judge shall have the discretion to permit or
require expert, skilled, or other complicated testimony to be
prepared in written form prior to the trial and to be presented
in narrative form before the court and/or jury in any case where
such a presentation will serve the interests of justice.'
(2) In any case where testimony prepared prior to trial is to
be presented narratively at trial, the court shall require that the
full text of such testimony and all exhibits thereto be disclosed
to opposing counsel within a reasonable time prior to trial to
insure that adequate opportunity for a voir dire examination
7. This procedure, limited to expert witnesses, is approved in Rule 408 of the
CODE

MODEL

[hereinafter cited as the MODEL CODE]. It has recently been adopted
in Section 907.07 of the WISCONSIN EVIDENCE CODE effective January 1, 1974. See infrapp.
OF EVIDENCE

72-73. The need for a more comprehensible method of introducing direct evidence
in technical and complex matters is an outgrowth of the undue reliance placed upon oral
question and answer presentation in jury cases. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMIiSTRATVE LAW TREATISE,
§ 14.16 (1958). Such ritualistic reliance has been criticized by the commentators as being
wasteful, cumbersome, inefficient, and ill suited to the presentation of technical data.
MCCORMICK § 17; 3 WIGMOPE § 767. Their valid criticisms go to the enormous expense of
technical testimony in time and money. Of greater significance is the fact that given the
expenditure, juries are not being presented with facts in an orderly, clear, and intelligible
manner. The proposal herein provides a method for dealing with the problem. This procedure is also endorsed in WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEw YORK Crvm PRACTICE, § 4515.03
at 45-236.
8. This follows the procedure employed in Rule 401(2) of the MODEL CODE, Rule 57
of the UNIFoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE [hereinafter cited as the UNIFoRM RULES], and Rule
802 of the CALIORNIA EvIDENCE CODE (West 1966). Procedures for a voir dire examination
of the witness are not specifically included in the PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED

(1973) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLES]
but under the common law, courts doubtless have the power to require it. See COMMENT
OF LAW REV. Comm., CAL. EvID. CODE § 802 (West 1966).
STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES
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and preparation of cross-examination of the witness is provided.'
(3) The voir dire examination of the witness shall be held
in the presence of the trial judge or a master, and a complete
record shall be made thereof. He shall rule on all evidentiary
and other objections to the testimony in advance of trial in order
that the narrative presented at trial be free of technical objections. At the voir dire examination, counsel may inquire of the
witness as to the source of and the basis for any and all statements made in the prepared testimony and shall state all evidentiary objections thereto.'"
(4) In the interests of justice and judicial economy, and to
the extent practicable, the court, in its discretion, may require
that in cases where both or all parties intend to use prepared
testimony, all such testimony shall be made available to all
parties at or about the same time.
(5) The rulings of the court on such objections are interlocutory as if made at trial, and shall not be appealable until after
final judgment." Objections not made at the voir dire hearing
shall be deemed waived in the same manner as objections available but not made at trial.'"
B.

Method of Preparation

(1) The witness may prepare his or her testimony with the
assistance of counsel and such other persons as may be required
to present a clear and accurate account of the facts and/or opinions involved."3 All persons assisting the witness and their roles
9. Pursuant to Rule 705 of the PROPOsED FEDERAL RULES, the courts may require
disclosure by the expert of the fact and data underlying his opinion. This provision of the
PRoPoSED FEDERAL RuLEs seeks to eliminate the requirement of the hypothetical question
and is similar to statutes in effect in California, Kansas, New Jersey, New York and
Wisconsin. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 802 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456, 60-457
(1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A, 4A (1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw (McKinney 1963) § 4515
[hereinafter cited as N.Y. CPLR]; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 907.05 (1973). See also UNIFORM
RULES 57, 58 and MODEL CODE Rule 409. The current proposal implicitly removes the
requirement of the hypothetical question and specifically requires disclosure and
opportunity of voir dire examination.
10. The purpose of this provision is to overcome the fears of unfair advantage which
many lawyers believe to exist where disclosure is made on the basis of priority and lacks
mutuality. The proposal follows the spirit of Rule 4, CiWL RULES OF THE UNrrED STATES
DIsTuT COURTS FOR THE SouTHERN AND EASTERN DisTICrs OF NEW YORK, which was
designed to eliminate the abuses of priority. The spirit of this rule has been adopted in
FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(d).
11. This follows the federal practice. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1970).
12. See, e.g., MCCORMICK §§ 52, 53; 1 WIGMORE § 18.
13. The assistance of persons other than the witness in preparation of expert testimony has long been recognized. See, MODEL CODE, Rules 405(d) and 408.
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in the preparation shall be fully disclosed in the testimony. 4
(2) Counsel are encouraged to assist in the preparation of
the testimony to insure clarity of presentation.
(3) The prepared testimony of a witness shall be accompanied by an affidavit swearing to or affirming such testimony.
Such affidavit shall be presented with the narrative prior to
trial.
C.

Method of Presentation

(1) The trial court shall have the discretion to regulate the
method of presentation to the jury. 5 After the witness is sworn,
the court may circulate copies of the direct testimony of the
witness to the jury for its reading and inspection. Thereafter, the
court may direct the witness to read the testimony to the jury
or, in an appropriate case, to dispense with the reading and
enter the narrative in the record as direct testimony of the witness upon his or her adoption thereof. Thereafter, the witness
shall be exposed to live cross-examination within the presence
of the jury."
(2) The court, in its discretion, shall regulate the order of
proof as between witnesses with prepared direct testimony and
other witnesses who render direct testimony live with the objective of conducting a clear and orderly presentation of the facts.

II. THE PROPOSAL: ITS BACKGROUND AND BENEFITS
Although portions of the proposal are new, the concept is not
a novel one. In 1937, the Uniform Expert Testimony Act included
a provision for permitting court appointed experts to read their
17
reports into evidence subject to objections as to admissibility.
14. The need for this requirement is obvious.
15. This is a power which the courts already have. See, e.g.,

PROPOSED FEDERAL RULEs,

Rule 611(a); MCCORMICK § 5; 6 WIGMORE § 1867. See also, MODEL CODE, Rule 105, which

spells out the powers of the courts in detail.
16. The requirement of live cross-examination is indispensible to the working of the
proposal. Moreover, the availability of cross after disclosure of the testimony in advance
plus the voir dire should remove any lingering doubts as to confrontation clause problems.
See, e.g., Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1973); Californiav. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970);
Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
17. Section 6, UNIFORM EXPERT TESTIMONY Aar OF 1937, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMM. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCHEDINGs at 343 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as UNIORM EXPERT TESTIMONY ACT]. The section was patterned after
a 1923 Rhode Island Statute, Gen. Laws, 1923, Ch. 342, § 5003 and a 1931 Wisconsin
enactment, Stat., 1931 S. 357,12. Similar proposals were advanced by the America Institute on Criminal Law in 1914 and The Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of
the American Bar Association in 1926.
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In 1942, the drafters of the Model Code of Evidence noting that
the law regarding opinion and expert evidence required substantial revision,"8 proposed that in the court's discretion, all expert
reports be read in evidence. 9 The sole rationale for this suggestion
was "[t]he desirability of presenting such testimony to the jury
in a connected narrative and the most lucid form is obvious
")20

Although the desirability of such a clear presentation seemed
"obvious" to the nation's leading practitioners and legal scholars,21 it apparently was less obvious to the bench and bar. The
requirements of Rule 408 of the Model Code of Evidence have not
been widely adopted by the states2" nor are they to be found in
the current Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.2" The Uniform
Rules of Evidence also failed to specifically adopt the procedure
but there is some indication that the drafters considered the matter to be one of inherent judicial power and permissible under the
rules as drafted. 4 Wisconsin, however, has adopted the approach
18. INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTER V., MODEL CODE.
19. MODEL CODE, Rule 408.
20. Id., COMMnT ON RLE 408.See also COMMENT TO SECTiON 6 of the UNIFORM EXPERT
AcT at 343. Other added attractions might lie in judicial economy and enhanced opportunities for settlement.
21. The Committee on Evidence for the Model Code included Professors Morgan,
McCormick, Maguire and Ladd; Judges Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, Wyzanski and
Patterson. For the full roster see MODEL CODE at iii. The Chief Consultant was Dean
Wigmore, id. at v.
22. The written presentation has not been adopted in the code states of California,
Kansas and New Jersey. It has been adopted in Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 917-20 (1970), and Wisconsin, Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 907.07 (1973).
23. PROPosED FEDERAL RuLEs, Art. VII, 56 F.R.D. 183, 281 (1973). The drafters of the
PRoPOsE FEDERAL RuLEs have noted their opposition to any widespread use of prior
prepared statements as substantive proof. See Advisory Committee note to Rule 801
(d)(1). The author does not disagree with this view. The Committee's position was not
taken in regard to the proposal suggested here or any similar procedure such as the one
suggested in MODEL CODE § 408. Indeed, the rules as to expert testimony in Article VII
are quite liberal. Rather, the Committee's comment seems to express a fear that the
hearsay exceptions for prior statements of the witness embodied in Rule 801 (d)(1) could
be a vehicle for dispensing with oral testimony entirely. No such proposal is suggested
here. The Committee does recognize that a witness may adopt an out-of-court statement
and not be barred by hearsay. See Advisory Committee note to Rule 801 (d)(1). This
recognition is shared by the author and would permit the procedure suggested here.
Accord, MODEL CODE § 503(b) and UNiFORM RuLES, Rule 63(1). See text and notes infra
at pp. 80-81. The drafters' fear that MODEL CODE § 503(b) and UNIFORM RuLEs, Rule 63(1)
would lead to widespread use of prepared testimony has not been justified. See
McCoRMICK § 251, p. 603.
24. UNIFoRM RuLEs, COMMENT TO RuLE 59. See also UNIFORM RuLEs, Rule 63(1) which
would permit the suggested procedure.
TEsToN
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in its Rules of Evidence scheduled to take effect on January 1,
1974.2
It is submitted that trial judges in most jurisdictions have
the discretion to implement the procedures proposed herein without further legislation since virtually every jurisdiction in the
United States grants its courts wide discretion in determining
how trials are to proceed.2 6 To accomplish the aims of the proposal, judges must take a more activist approach to the conduct
of trials. Frequently, the court leaves matters of presentation
largely in the hands of counsel for fear of unduly intruding upon
counsel's domain. 2 This is a fundamental misapprehension. The
responsibility here lies entirely with the trial judge. Though the
game or sporting theory of trials puts the judge into the position
of referee or umpire, this is not the proper role for the court. The
proper role is seen in the English practice where the judge actively
participates as "director of the proceedings and as an administra'2
tor of justice.

The failure to employ the written narrative in jury trials is
not attributable to a lack of familiarity with the approach. Lawyers have long used similar presentations and procedures in
connection with matters litigated before various federal regulatory agencies. 29 Moreover, the written direct is routinely employed by stipulation in civil nonjury cases when the testimony
is likely to be of a technical and complicated nature." The use of
this type of presentation has been specifically approved in the
25. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 907.07 (1973).

26. Rule 26 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVr PROCEDURE and Rule 43 of the FEDERAL
RULES OF CRUMNAL PROCEDURE generally require that testimony be taken orally in open
court. These Rules are based upon sixth amendment confrontation requirements. Advisory Committee Introductory Note to Article VIII, PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES. The proposal
suggested here meets confrontation requirements. See note 16 supra. In jurisdictions
which require specific legislation, common law rules of evidence may be altered by legislation provided no constitutional rights are affected. The litigant generally has no vested or
constitutional right in the maintenance of a rule of evidence. See, e.g., Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); cf. Bandini Petrol Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
27. See, e.g., PROPOSED FEDERAL RUF s, Rule 611; MODEL CODE, Rule 105; Wisc.STAT.
ANN. § 906.11 (1973). For the general rule in non-code jurisdictions see 53 Am. JUR. § 34
and cases cited in nn. 9, 10 and 11; 88 C.J.S. § 36.
28. 3 WIOMORE § 784 at 188.
29. See note 38 infra; see also K. DAvis, ADmuNSTRATtvE LAW TREATIE §§ 14, 16
(1958); Corber, Written Evidence in Administrative Proceedings:A Plea for Less Talk, 6
U. RICH. L. Rav. 197 (1972).
30. E. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EvDENcE 58 (1963); Trans World Airlines v.
Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (SDNY 1969), discussed infra pp. 76-77.
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Administrative Procedure Act,3 recommended by the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," and commended for use by experts in trials of complicated or protracted
cases.

33

There are significant benefits to be gained by the use of the
written narrative statement. The Attorney General's Report
noted that written direct evidence would greatly benefit the litigants in effecting expedition, economy, accuracy and convenience. 4 The report, which specifically called for the35 use of "canned
testimony" for technical matters, observed that:
Lengthy testimony of a complex character is not easy to comprehend in the hearing room nor can satisfactory cross-examination
follow immediately upon its conclusion. A far better understanding of the evidence and a great saving of time and expense
would be attained if the method above described were employed.
To be sure, many administrative hearings are held for the
purpose of rule or rate making. The agency is presumed to possess
a high degree of technical experience and may even go beyond the
record and take in "legislative facts" 3' in the decision-making
process. Their labors are made substantially less difficult by the
use of written evidence. The fact that administrative hearings
may be distinguished from jury trials, however, is no excuse for
not borrowing tested methods of presenting proof where jury trials
would benefit from the borrowing."
Matters adjudicated by administrative agencies are just as
important to the contestants as those involved in trials by jury.
Indeed, where money is at issue the matters are strikingly simi31. Section 7(c), Administrative ProcedureAct, 5 U.S.C.A. § 557.
32. 1941 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATroRNE GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE at 69 (1941) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]. See also the

recommendations of the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure in 1953, 15
F.R.D. 217, 221 (1953).
33. See 3 WIGMORE § 787; see also Jud. Conf. Study Group on Procedure in Pro.
tracted Litigation, Handbook of Recommended Proceduresfor the Trial of Protracted
Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
34. ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT at 60.

35. Id. at 70. See also KMOrON at 321, and LEVIN & CRAMER, TRIAL ADVOcAcY at 129
(1968).
36. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARv. L. REV. 364 (1942), and MCCORMICK § 331.
37. McCoRMICK § 17; 3 WIGMOiR § 787; Stephens, What Courts Can Learn From

Commissions, 19 A.B.A.J. 141, 142 (1933).
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lar.35 Yet we condone, indeed require a procedure involving writ-

ten presentations in one case

9

and oral presentations in the

other.40

Dean Wigmore has attacked the apparent prohibition on the
use of written testimony.4" Although he recognizes the risk of
fabrication and coaching, 42 he believes that where expert testimony is involved, the risk is slight, 3 and is more than outweighed
by the benefits of lucidity, accuracy and increased comprehension that would be gained. He favors the free use of such testimony.44
38. Rule 77 of the General Rules of Practice applicable to litigation before the Interstate Commerce Commission permits the witness, with approval of the Hearing Officer,
to read his testimony, including expressions of opinion as well as statements of fact, into
the record. Moreover, his written report may be received in evidence as an exhibit, provided that it contains no argument. The procedure requires that the witness give a copy
to his opposition and file it with the commission on a schedule to be fixed by the Hearing
Officer. The Hearing Officer has the discretion to require a live presentation if in his
opinion the memory or demeanor of the witness may be of importance. 49 C.F.R.
§ 1100.77 (1972).
In addition, the Interstate Commerce Commission maintains a shortened or modified
procedure in certain rate cases which upon consent of the parties does away with all oral
appearance of witnesses. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1100.45-1100.54 (1972). For a discussion of this
procedure see 2 K. DAVIS, ADImuSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.16 (1958).
The Civil Aeronautics Board also requires that evidence be presented in written form
wherever feasible in its economic proceedings 14 C.F.R. § 302.24(b) (1972), and requires
that in mail rate and certain other proceedings all direct evidence be submitted in written
form. 14 C.F.R. §§ 302. 1312 and 302.1412 (1972).
The Department of Agriculture has long used a written procedure for claims under a
certain amount (recently increased from $1,500 to $3,000) in connection with perishable
agricultural commodities 7 U.S.C.A. § 49f(C) (1972), and allows for the use of affidavits
9 C.F.R. § 202.11(e)(4) (1973); 17 C.F.R. § 0.11(e)(4) (1973) and shortened procedures 99
C.F.R. 202.17 (1973), 17 C.F.R. § 0.17, 0.67 and 0.90 (1973) where the parties so stipulate.
39. To the litigant money doesn't alter its character because awarded by an agency
rather than a jury. Compare Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) with Long v. U.S.
59 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1932) and White v. Zutell, 263 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959), all of which
are discussed infra at pp. 78-79.
40. E. MORGAN, BASIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 58 (4th ed. 1963); 3 WIGMORE § 740.
41. 3 WIoMOR §§ 740 and 787 at 212.
42. 3 WIGMORE § 787 at 210.
43. Id. at 212. The opportunity for voir dire and cross should suffice to handle fabrication and coaching problems even with the fact witness as distinct from the expert.
44. Id. Wigmore notes that some jurisdictions ban the use of the written narrative
pursuant to an overly restrictive view of the past recollection recorded rule. 3 WIGMORE
§§ 738, 740. Under the restrictive rule, contemporary recordings will be admitted only if
the witness lacks a present recollection. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949); Russell v. Hudson River Ry. Co., 17 N.Y. 134,140 (1858);
3 WIoMORE § 738. The better rule favors admissibility by a recognition that the contemporary document is likely to be more trustworthy than the witness' present recollection. This
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The Handbook of Recommended Proceduresfor the Trial of
Protracted Cases, adopted by the Judicial Conference of the
United States,45 specifically calls for the use of new techniques
and devices to improve accuracy and expedite decision in cases
involving scientific, technical or economic issues." Among the
procedures called for is the use of written summaries of testimony
given to the court and adversary in advance of trial.47
The proposal set out above is largely patterned after the
procedure fashioned in the celebrated case of Trans World Airlines v. Hughes.4" As the parties approached the trial of the action
after many years of discovery, motion practice, and appeals, it
was apparent that the matters to be tried were so rife with technical detail concerning the economics of the commercial air transport industry that if traditional methods of trial practice were
followed, the evidence would be incomprehensible. Moreover, it
was clear that ordinary courtroom presentation would make
cross-examination of the various expert witnesses a hopeless and
empty gesture. A procedure, similar to the proposal outlined
above was evolved from the realization that the case could not be
tried in the normal, accepted fashion. It was born of necessity and
largely promulgated as the case went along. Once it was agreed
that expert evidence would be taken in written, narrative form for
the purpose of direct, all direct evidence proceeded to be presented in that fashion-expert and general factual testimony
alike.49
approach is now the majority rule and would permit the use of a prepared narrative. 3
WIGMORE §§ 738, 787. Even the restrictive rule is merely precautionary-and policy considerations dictate that it not be used to prevent written direct by experts. 3 WoMORE
§ 787.
45. Jud. Conf. Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, Handbook of
Recommended Proceduresfor the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
46. Id. at 416.
47. Id.
48. The author was heavily involved in the preparation and trial of this matter for

some ten years. Citations to this case are too numerous to list. Relevant citations for the
purpose of this article are found infra in notes 51 and 52.
49. The written form worked equally well with "expert" and "fact" witnesses. The
distinctions between such witnesses are becoming more hazy with the passing years. We
have even arrived at a recognition that "fact" witnesses really may give opinion evidence.
PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLE 701.
The lay witness with complex testimony has specifically been included in the proposal
as a matter of policy. It is just as important that his or her testimony be clearly understood
by the jury as well as the experts, indeed it is more important. The barriers to receiving
such lay testimony in written form are much the same as in the case of the expert. Both
are well prepared by counsel in advance of trial and have reached understandings with
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Voir dire examination of the witnesses permitted the making
of objections and cleansed the record of inadmissible testimony.

With the benefit of a written direct, cross-examination was well
prepared and generally incisive. The testimony itself was more

thoughtful and complete than it would have been if orally delivered pursuant to question and answer.

Counsel and the witnesses for both parties were considerably
better prepared than they would have been under ordinary circumstances. The written narrative form required far greater attention to detail. By its nature, it called for a refinement of analysis that is simply absent in the oral presentation. Moreover, the

close relationship of counsel to the project, frequently, though not
always, resulted in a presentation in language which could be

understood by the trier of the fact.
In this particular instance, the trier was a special master of

great acumen but with no previous experience in this technical
field." The form of presentation coupled with well prepared crossexamination enabled him to understand the evidence being presented. He demonstrated this fully in a report of 323 pages containing his trial findings." The procedure had the added value of

assisting a number of reviewing courts in understanding and following the proceedings below. 2

Opponents of this type of procedure will point out that what
may be very well for an administrative agency, or a judge sitting

in a non-jury case or even a special master, is not advisable in a
jury case. 3 Somehow a jury case is different. The jury must be
protected. Protected from what is a proper question. Surely, the
counsel at that time. As to credibility, both must be tested in the same fashion. That the
lay witness may be more partisan is arguable, but even if that be true, his credibility can
be tested on cross much as it is today. The proposal has little effect on the credibility of
the lay witness save as to permit a better prepared cross to attack it.
The proposal is not, however, an invitation to commit all lay testimony to writing.
The type of lay fact witness contemplated is one whose testimony is not unlike that of
the expert under the same circumstances. It will ordinarily involve difficult economic or
technical industry matters or a set of facts so tangled that the ordinary presentation must
be dispensed with in order that the jury understand the testimony.
50. Hon. Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General of the United States.
51. Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
52. Id., Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd 449
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
53. Indeed, only one case has been found where the court exercised its discretion and
permitted the witness' written testimony to be read to the jury. There, the witness' power
of speech had been affected. How the witness could be effectively cross-examined under
these circumstances was not answered by the court which proceeded on the assumption
that it could be done. See Ward v. City of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 156, 44 A.2d 553 (1945).
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proposal offered here would afford the jury greater protection
against "tainted" evidence than now exists, since the testimony
would be cleansed prior to its presentation. Moreover, wasteful,
confusing and time-consuming objections would be removed from
the sight and hearing of the jury.
Insulation of the jury from technical objections and prejudicial evidence are only a part of the story, for these matters are
but procedural incidents of our traditional beliefs as to how a jury
trial ought to be conducted. It is desirable that jury trials proceed
with dignity and some solemnity with due regard for tradition. 4
Such legitimate concerns however, should not be used as an argument for the maintenance of trial procedures which render clear
factual presentations impossible.
5 the Supreme Court upheld the
In Richardson v. Perales'
admissibility of physicians' reports in a proceeding under the
Social Security Act involving a claim for disability insurance benefits. There, the written reports of several physicians were received in evidence to defeat the claim despife the fact that the
physicians were not orally interrogated either on direct or crossexamination. The Court deemed the reports substantial evidence
despite their hearsay character and permitted their use in agency
proceedings.
In commenting on the procedure employed by the agency,
the Court noted:56
There emerges an emphasis upon the informal rather than the
formal. This, we think, is as it should be, for this administrative
procedure, and these hearings, should be understandable to the
layman claimant, should not necessarily be stiff and comfortable only for the trained attorney, and should be liberal and not
strict in tone and operation. This is the obvious intent of Congress so long as the procedures are fundamentally fair.
These same concepts ought to apply with even greater force
in jury cases.
Peralesis an interesting example because the concern of the
litigant (money) and the controlling question of law (admissibility of written reports) are common both to agency proceedings
54. That we fulfill this desire only infrequently may be a sympton of the bar's attitude toward the trial process. The lack of regard lawyers have for the institution and
perhaps for each other is manifested on a daily basis in courtrooms throughout the country. See, e.g., Berger, A Sick Profession, 27 FED. B.J. 228 (1967).

55. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
56. 402 U.S. at 400-401.
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and jury trials.5 The Supreme Court, in affirming the agency
decision to admit the written reports, relied heavily on two cases
permitting the adversary use of expert medical reports made and
kept in accordance with the business records statute: 58 In Long v.
United States59 and White v. Zutell,0 which were both tried to
juries,' the admission of medical reports in evidence, pursuant to
an exception to the hearsay rule for records kept in the regular
course of business, was permitted. It is important to point out
here that in Perales and White the medical reports had been
specifically prepared for litigation while in Long it had been prepared in anticipation of litigation. In no case were the experts
called upon to testify by the proponents of their reports and in
all, agency and jury trial alike, the reports were admitted as
substantive proof of the facts. The courts reasoned, however, that
since opposing counsel had the opportunity to call and examine
the witnesses but chose not to do so, they had effectively waived
their hearsay objections. This is arguably illogical for it places the
burden of presenting evidence on the wrong shoulders; 2 but that
aside, if written evidence may be received before a jury without
the oral adoption by the preparer and with no cross-examination,
a fortioriit ought to be received where the preparer adopts it and
is cross-examined. In requiring the expert to adopt his testimony
and be cross-examined upon it, the proposal affords greater protection to the jury than now exists, while encouraging far greater
clarity than is generally apparent in today's trials. It is good
public policy to protect a jury from prejudicial evidence, but care
must be taken not to over-protect it to the point that the essential
facts cannot be understood. Years of "protection" have resulted
in placing unreasonable barriers between the jury and the proceedings it views, between the court and the citizenry it is to
63
serve.
57. See infra notes 38 and 39.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
59. 59 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1932).
60. 263 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959).

61. See also Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
342 U.S. 868 (1951); Terrasi v. South Atlantic Lines, 226 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1955) and cases

cited at 825.
62. Compare Perales with Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
63. The courtroom is a place where people come into close contact with their government. Indeed, other than in military service, paying taxes and parking violations, the
courtroom may be the only place where actual substantial contact is effected. For the
citizen, it may be the most important governmental contact of his life. Yet, as all trial
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The proposal would have the effect of bringing down some of
these barriers while allowing discretion in the judge to erect them
again where necessary. Use of the narrative form would by definition end the laborious question and answer direct, place a premium on cross-examination and end the fiction of the leading question objection. Where objections are made to the direct, the court
will be able to rule with the perspective of the entire testimony
before it. This will result in rulings of a more substantive and less
formalistic nature.
Thoughtful attorneys will raise questions of significance with
regard to the procedure advocated above. Some will wonder how
a jury of lay people will be able to comprehend the written narrative. The proposed procedure does not guarantee comprehension,
but it does make it more likely. The juror who fails to understand
the question and answer direct will have a far better opportunity
to understand the evidence if it is presented in a lucid, logical
manner without breaks for objection. He will have the opportunity to read and hear the testimony simultaneously. Ideally, it will
be written in plain English with suitable definition of terms.
Moreover, the cross-examination will certainly be more intelligible and easier to follow than is now the case.
In the following pages, further questions of moment concerning this procedure are discussed seriatim.They include the narrative versus the ritual form of interrogation, demeanor and credibility, leading questions and discovery. Before moving on to these
issues, the question of hearsay must first be put to rest.

Ill. HEARSAY
To some, the adoption of an out of court statement, albeit a
sworn one, for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted, may sound like hearsay. The issue need not be so viewed,
particularly if attention is paid to the purposes of the hearsay
rule. The rule seeks to exclude certain out-of-court statements
because their reliability cannot be tested by our traditional
method of cross-examination.64 By definition this is not the case
here. If anything, the cross here will be better prepared than in
lawyers know, this is not the layman's territory. The hallowed ground here belongs to
counsel. The world of expertise may require that this shall always be so but the bar must
not be so enamored of its rituals and traditions as to render jury trials intelligible only to
counsel and court and unfathomable to the parties and witnesses.
64. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,407 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420
(1965); McCoRmICK § 245 at 583.
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the ordinary case. At least the opportunity for it will be greater.
In the hearsay situation, the declarant may be unavailable for
examination, hence his statement is considered inherently unreliable 5 unless the circumstances of his utterance or act supply the
requisite reliability.6 6 Thus, we admit all manner of extra-judicial
statements and actions as exceptions to the hearsay rule or as
7
nonhearsay for purposes other than as substantive proof.
Since, under the suggested procedure, the declarant is available, testifies under oath, and is subject to cross, none of the
reliability problems found in hearsay cases is apparent." Recognizing this, the authorities do not include this type of presentation as one running afoul of the rule against hearsay." In another
view, the witness can be seen as actually presenting his evidence
in court for the first time, his prepared narration having no independent significance. In this view, there is no out of court asser70
tion at all and therefore no hearsay.
IV.

THE NARRATIVE STATEMENT VS. "TRADITIONAL"

QUESTION AND

ANSWER

Direct examination of a witness through the use of the strict
question and answer method is perhaps the most difficult skill the
neophyte practitioner must learn. The difficulty of the art lies not
in learning when a question is leading 7' or calls for hearsay information or transgresses other evidentiary formulations, but rather
that the whole ritual is quite contrary to that which we practice
in daily life.
Ordinarily, we listen to one relating a tale of woe, interrupting only to keep the relator on the track or because we fail to
understand a certain point of the narrative. This is not simply
good manners, it is good sense. What is sought is the witness'
65. Lack of demeanor evidence is one of the grounds for the hearsay objection.
§ 245 at 582. As to the effect herein see infra pp. 83-86.
66. This is the basis of most of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See note 68 infra.
67. See, e.g., Proposed FEDERAL RuLEs, Rules 803, 804; McCouacK, Chs. 24-34.
68. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970); MODEL CODE, Rule 503(b); Umronu RULES, Rule 63(1).
69. See ADViSoRY CosrrrE NOTE to Rule 801(d)(1), PROPOSED FEDERl RULES. There
it is phrased: "If the witness admits on the stand that he made the statement and that it
was true, he adopts the statement and there is no hearsay problem." MODEL CODE, Rule
503(b) and UmFORA RULES, Rule 63(1) are to the same effect. See also Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965).
70. McCORmiCK § 246 at 584; PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES, Rule 801(c); UNIFORM RULES,
MCCORMICK

Rule 63;

MODEL CODE,

Rule 501(2).

71. See infra pp. 86-89.
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basic story. To be sure, missing details and memories must be
supplied by jogging the mind with questions. Interrogation ab
initio, however, may tend to confuse the basic details. Where
technical or highly complex matters are at issue the method frequently fails. 2
Trial courts are given wide discretion in the matter of how
testimony is to be presented. 73 Despite this discretion, the tenor
of hundreds of decisions indicates that most of the bar is convinced that the question and answer method of eliciting direct
evidence is somehow derived from our ancient past and is, therefore, not to be unduly fiddled with. The primary reason set forth
for the use of this approach is to preserve opposing counsel's right
to make timely evidentiary objections. 7 It would seem that the
method was conceived for the convenience of the lawyers. In practice this is certainly the case, for no more inconvenient method
for witness and jury can be imagined. Even assuming, once one
is well schooled in the rigors of question and answer direct interrogation, that it works well enough for us, we 'must still ask ourselves whether what is best for us is best for our trial system. Both
our assumptions, that the method is proven by age and that since
it suits counsel it is best for the system, are false, and have been
criticized by observers for years.
Dean Wigmore notes that the standard objection to the narrative form is of relatively recent origin and relies on petty techni76
calities. 75 He states:
There is in the minds of courts and practitioners an obsession
that the natural way of giving testimony is the dangerous way.
The practice now goes to *absurdexcess. A healthy view of the
subject would banish the obsession and would restore the natu:
ral method as the usual one, thus obtaining more reliable testimony and a notable economy of time in trials.
Professor McCormick points out that the narrative form is likely
to be more complete and accurate in its representation of facts
than the question and answer method. 77 A view of the older cases
indicates that the traditional method of eliciting direct testimony
72. Note 7 supra.
73. Note 15 supra.
74. 3 WIGMOR § 767.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 148-150.
77. McCormick § 5 at 7 and materials cited in n.2; see Gardner, The Perceptionand
Memory of Witnesses, 18 Corn. L.Q. 391, 404 (1923).
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was not via the question and answer but through the narrative
form.7 8
In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Charless,7" counsel directed his
witness to "[t]urn to the jury, and tell them the facts in this
case. . .and tell them the complete story."8 Although no specific
objection was made to this question, counsel thereafter objected
during the narrative to various details asserting that they were
incompetent, hearsay, and immaterial. The trial court responded
that:"
. . .[T]he taking of the witness' testimony in the narrative
form would be the best way of getting at what he knew or could
state concerning the-matter at issue; that it would save time
. . .and would perhaps furnish to the jury a more connected
statement of the matter to be told as it occurred and took
place.
In affirming the ruling of the trial court the Ninth Circuit cited
Chitty, the leading text of the day, to the effect that' "[i]t is
certainly the practice . . .to desire the witness to give his own
account of the matter. ."2
Practitioners have also complained of an undue reliance
upon the question and answer technique. Some have questioned
the historical accuracy of judicial assumptions that interrogation
was the older recognized form. Arthur Howard, Jr. in his article
aptly titled: "Why Can't I Tell My Story?"," notes that Swift's
Digest, first published in 1810, states: "In the examination of
witnesses. . . the proper mode is to permit them in the first place
to tell their stories in their own language."84 The length to which
we go to protect ourselves from a narrative, coherent story is
illustrated by the recent case of Hutter Northern Trust v. Door
County Chamber of Commerce.15 There an attorney with no
courtroom experience appeared pro se as plaintiff and sought to
78. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Charless, 51 F. 562 (9th Cir. 1892) rev'd on othergrounds
162 U.S. 359 (1896); Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Hawkins, 163 Ala. 565, 51 So. 37 (1909);
People v. Davis, 6 Cal. App. 229, 91 P. 810 (1907); Thresher v. Stonington Say. Bank, 68
Conn. 201, 36 A. 38 (1896); Goldsmith v. Newhouse, 19 Colo. App. 1, 72 P. 809 (1903);
Horton v. State, 123 Ga. 145, 51 S.E. 287 (1905); King v. Andrews, 30 Ind. 429 (1868).
79. 51 F. 562 (9th Cir. 1892) rev'd on other grounds 162 U.S. 359 (1896).

80. Id. at 570.
81. Id.
82. Id., citing Cnrrry, 3 PRACTICE OF TH LAw 894 (1835).
83. 26 CONN. B.J. 183 (1952).
84. Id. at 183.
85. 467 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
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state his case in the narrative form. Of 1,210 pages of transcript
only 100 contained admitted testimony. Defense counsel insisted
that plaintiff ask himself the questions rather than testify narratively and the court agreed. Plaintiff attempted to do this and
was greeted with over 1,800 objections the majority made without
stated grounds but nevertheless sustained. As a result, most of
plaintiffs testimony was excluded, the trial court directing a verdict for the defendant.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the excluded evidence was essential to the plaintiffs case. 86 It ruled that the trial
court did have the discretion to require the question and answer
form but that it had gone too far here. Apparently, the defense
claimed on appeal that, inter alia, plaintiff's questions to himself
were leading. The Court of Appeals stated: "[I]t is difficult to
see how a question propounded by a witness who is examining
himself can rationally be objected to as leading."87
One wonders how the bench and bar became committed to
the interrogation method and why we adhere to it so rigorously.
The answer probably lies in our own developed expertise. In the
arena of the courtroom, counsel are the experts and usually dominate the proceedings. As in all other fields of expertise, we become
enamoured with our own technical rituals and forms. The overuse of the question and answer method is not simply the "petty
technicality" that Dean Wigmore describes. 8 It is frequently
that, to be sure, but it is more. It is a reliance upon a tool of our
expertness; a way of baffling the uninitiated. It is our own form
of mathematical equation developed uniquely for our use. As experts, we have tended to ignore the larger implications inherent
in the use of our own procedures. The courtroom is not our private
preserve for the playing out of lawyers' games. It is a forum for
the just resolution of private disputes. When all of those private
disputes are totalled and seen in perspective, the public nature
of our preserve becomes very clear indeed. Thus, our forms must
serve everyone, not merely our own convenience. Whatever benefits there may be in the question and answer form, they are outweighed by the narrative when an expert or complicated fact
witness is testifying. 89 Here the need for clarity must be primary
86. Id. at 1080.
87. Id. at 1078.
88. Note 75 supra.
89. To be sure, the ordinary narrative varies from the present proposal in terms of
spontaneity. Though it is lacking here, there is little question but that in the case of the
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or there can be no just, intelligent decision by the jury. As
Professor McCormick notes, ". . . the need for eliciting what the
witness knows in the most vivid and accurate way is an interest
to be balanced against the need of the adversary for a fair opportunity to object."9
As stated previously, the basis of the opposition to the narrative form is the need to preserve technical objections and insulate
the jury from hearing tainted testimony. The proposal offered
herein would accomplish this by requiring a voir dire examination
of the witness' written narrative prior to the trial. In this context,
counsel may raise all technical objections after a thorough reading and analysis of the proffered evidence. The court is given the
opportunity to rule on suspect passages beforehand and to have
them excised where appropriate. Thus, the testimony heard
and/or read by the jury is devoid of objectionable material and
of burdensome, time-consuming objections as well. The jury is
given the opportunity to hear and read a reasoned, well connected story with a clear statement of technical, scientific or
highly convoluted facts.
V.

DEMEANOR AND CREDIBILITY

A major consideration of trial attorneys in the presentation
of evidence is the demeanor of the witness. The personal presence
of the witness, his appearance, the manner in which he states his
evidence, the directness of his approach, his personality as it
were, may be considered by the jury in evaluating his credibility.9 Some will criticize the proposal herein on the ground that
the written narrative statement will adversely affect the jury's
right to have the demeanor evidence of the witness.
In defense, it must first be pointed out that under the terms
of the proposal the jury will see and hear a full, live crossexamination of the witness. Certainly, the demeanor of the witness under the pressure of a penetrating cross-examination is far
more revealing than the demeanor of the same witness responding
to questions of friendly counsel on direct.
The major credibility problem with expert witnesses stems
from the desire of some experts and their counsel that the witness
expert it is always lacking. The problem is greater where the fact witness is concerned.
There, narrative spontaneity is very desirable. In the complex case, however, it is seldom
realized as counsel carefully prepares the witness beforehand.

90. McComIcK § 5 at 8.
91. 3A WIoMoPE § 946.
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become an advocate for the cause.2 Code drafters have sought to
reduce the advocacy of the expert by proposals for court appointed experts,93 coupled with proposals for the submission of
written reports similar to the procedure suggested here." No foolproof method has been suggested. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that the narrative form with the assistance of counsel may stimulate greater efforts by the expert, particularly in researching matters of detail and underlying fact. This will come about because
of the threat of a more penetrating cross-examination which is
inherent in the procedure. The expert may still be an advocate;
at least, he will become a prepared advocate.
The proposal gives the court wide discretion in the matter of
how the evidence shall be presented. If the judge is of the view
that the demeanor of the witness is an important consideration,
he may order that the witness give testimony in the ordinary
course. Several alternatives to this are apparent. The proposal
permits the court to have the witness read his direct to the jury,
a method recently employed in matters where the credibility of
the witnesses were matters of the highest national importance."
As an option of recent origin, and in the interest of saving
time, the court could have the direct testimony delivered by video
tape. This method has been approved in several recent cases. In
Rubino v. G.D. Searle & Co.,9" in addition to the usual transcript,
a New York court permitted the defendant to make a video tape
of the deposition of its former director of biological research. The
court held that Section 3113(b) of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (hereinafter N.Y. CPLR) required only that the
testimony be recorded. A stenographic transcript is not the only
means of accomplishing the statutory objective. Although the
court did not rule on the admissibility of the tape at trial, it
suggested that if a proper foundation was laid,9" and if the terms
92. McCoRMICK § 17 at 38; 2 WIGMORE § 563, n. 2; MODEL CODE, INTRODUCTORY NOTE
TO CH. V at 198.
93. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, Rule 403; PRoPosED FEDERAL RuLEs, Rule 706.
94. MODEL CODE, Rules 405, 408; Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 907.06, 907.07 (1973).
95. As in the Senate Watergate hearings. There is an obvious difference between a
jury trial and a congressional hearing. However, in the context of the demeanor and
credibility of a witness who reads his prepared narrative testimony to any fact-finding
panel, the distinction vanishes.
96. 73 Misc. 2d 447, 340 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1973). The Missouri
courts have recently permitted the use of video taped depositions. State ex rel. Lucas v.
Moss, 498 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1973).
97. See Miller, Videotaping the Oral Deposition, 18 PRAc. LAw. No. 2, 45, 56-57
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of Section 3117(a) (3) of the N.Y. CPLR were met, the tape could
be used.1
In June, 1973, a Vermont court directed the use of video
pretaped testimony in a criminal jury case." The court aid counsel labored in advance of trial to tape all the testimony, edit out
objectionable material,and prepare it for the viewing of the jury.
Approval of the experiment was granted by the Vermont Supreme Court. Judge's and jurors' time was saved in the experiment, as counsel were able to tape the direct and cross outside of
their presence. " ' Even more recently, a California court held its
first prerecorded video tape trial. The trial was held pursuant to
a grant from the National Institute for Law Enforcement as part
of an eight state project of the National Center on State Courts. 1 '
Though video tape will preserve demeanor evidence for the
jury, courts and legislatures have permitted the introduction of
evidence with demeanor necessarily excluded. This obtains whenever a pre-trial deposition or testimony at a former trial is permitted to be read to the jury in the absence of the witness. Such use
of a deposition is widely permitted where the witness is dead or
beyond a certain distance from the courthouse, or is unable to
attend due to illness, age, imprisonment, or when the party offering the deposition is unable to procure the appearance of the
witness, or in the interests of justice. 02
In addition to the foregoing, we readily admit all manner of
out-of-court, demeanorless and cross examinationless evidence as
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, 0 3 and for non-hearsay purposes including impeachment of the credibility of the in-court
witness.' 4 Moreover, we admit writings in evidence which cannot
(1972); see also Comment, Use of Videotape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse, 20
DEPAuL L. REv. 924, 943 (1971).
98. See text accompanying note 102 infra.

99. New York Times, June 23, 1973, p. 32 col. 5.
100. The jury found the defendant guilty. In connection with the video tape procedure, one may speculate whether it is easier for a jury to convict when the defendant is
seen on tape but where his or her physical presence is lacking. It also seems appropriate
to inquire whether the laboratory clean tape presentation causes a change in the ethos of
the trial.
101. New York Times, September 23, 1973, p. 28 col. 1. Video taped depositions are
now widely used in Ohio which also is pioneering in presenting entire trials by video tape.
See 45 OHIO B.J. 1 (1972) and 46 OHIo ST. BAR REP. 110 (1973).
102. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 32 (a)(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110A § 212 (Smith-Hurd
1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-313 (1973); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 887.12 (1972); Omo REV. CODE
ANN.

§ 2319.05 (1972); IND. R. PRO. TR..33 (1970); N.Y. CPLR § 3117(a) (2), (3) (McKin-

ney 1970). The requirements vary somewhat among the jurisdictions but virtually all have
a procedure for admitting such demeanorless testimony.
103. See, e.g., PROPOSED FEDERAL RuL's 803, 804.
104. For instance, to prove the making of an oral contract or in cases of libel or
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be tested by demeanor, but which we find ways of testing for
factual credibility nevertheless.'
In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that the proposal
presented here gives the court ample room to preserve demeanor
evidence where and to the degree it seems necessary on direct
while guaranteeing it to the jury on cross-examination.' As can
be seen, much of our present practice falls far short of this.
VI.

LEADING QUESTIONS AND THE ROLE OF COUNSEL

When counsel actually assists in the promulgation of the
witness' direct testimony on the stand, some practitioners would
object that the testimony is leading and should be stricken. There
is probably not a more frivolous objection in our legal lexicon, and
its use with most expert witnesses is an attempt to foist an untruth upon the jury. Surely, no lawyer worthy of his shingle would
permit his witness to take the stand without careful preparation.
In the case of the expert witness, it is not divulging a closely
guarded secret to note that counsel has a large hand in the preparation of the testimony and indeed, if the presentation is written,
as for use before an administrative agency, will likely do much of
the writing himself.
This procedure is proper, but does permit counsel to insert
his own ideas. As McCormick points out:'
[T]he normal practice is for the careful lawyer to interview in
advance all witnesses whom he expects to call for direct examination to prove his own case. This practice is entirely proper,
but it does create a probability that the lawyer and the witness
will have reached an entente which will make the witness especially susceptible to suggestions from the lawyer.
Not unlike the narrative form discussed earlier, the matter
of leading questions is discretionary with the court' whose action
slander-the operative fact doctrine. See Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922); MCCORMICK, § 249.
105. See MCCORMICK § 245 at 582. We also take evidence of judicial notice and test
it by affidavit and argument but not often by examination of witnesses.
106. Some practitioners will cavil at the procedure because they wish their expert to
cut an impressive figure on direct before the jury. An impressive report and an implacable
appearance on cross will do just as well. Counsel's desires to impress the jury must, in
any event, take second place to a clear presentation of the facts.
107. McCORMCK, § 6 at 9.
108. Rotolo v. U.S. 404 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1968); McClard v. U.S. 386 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 866 (1967); Linn v. U.S., 251 F. 476 (2d Cir. 1918); St.
Clair v. U.S., 154 U.S. 134 (1894).
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will be affirmed unless it amounts to the denial of a fair trial,10 9
or a miscarriage of justice.110 The frivolity of the objection is manifest, for the objectionable question can be made right simply by
a rephrasing after the suspect suggestion has been planted., Indeed, the vast majority of what some lawyers mistakenly believe
to be leading questions are perfectly proper."' Thus, when the
three most crucial problems with a witness arise, i.e. when the
witness' recollection has been exhausted, or when the information cannot otherwise be obtained, or when directing his attention
to further material evidence, leading questions on direct examination are the correct method of interrogation,113 the allowance of
which will almost never be overturned on appeal.'
In a sense, of course, every question is leading. Were it not
so, the trial could not advance.115 These questions are not incompetent per sell' and will always be permitted where justice so
17
1

requires.

Long ago, jurists recognized the true quality of this objection.
In Nicholls v. Dowding,11 8 quoted by Wigmore, Lord Chief Justice
Ellenborough stated: "In general, no objections are more frivolous
than those which are made to questions as leading ones." ' 9 Chief
Judge Collier once remarked: "Objections to questions on the
ground that they are leading are generally captious and not in12 0
tended to subserve the ends of justice.

109. Id.
110. Usher v. Eckhardt, 176 Minn. 210, 222 N.W. 924 (1929).
111. 3 WIOMORE § 770 at 161; E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 57 (1954);
McCoRMICK § 6 at 9 and cases cited in n. 11.
112. So-called leading questions are permitted for preliminary matters, matters not
in dispute, to suggest the topic but not the answer, children, ignorant or timid witnesses,
language problems, and hostile witnesses. See, e.g., McCORMICK § 6 at 10; E. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 57 (1954); 3 WIGMORE § 769-778.
113. Id. See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE TO RULE 611(c), PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULEs.
114. 3 WIGMoRE § 770.
115. State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 78, 174 A.2d 881, 889 (1961).
116. State v. Johnson, 272 N.C. 239, 158 S.E.2d 95 (1967); Urbani v. Razza, 103 R.I.
445, 238 A.2d 383 (1968). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.24 (1968) which states:
"Within the discretion of the court no question asked of a witness shall be deemed objectionable solely because it is leading."
117. See CAL. EvD. CODE § 767 (West 1966); Fajerink v. State, 439 P.2d 783 (Ala.
1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 881 (1968); Midland R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 84 Ark. 81, 104
S.W. 540 (1907); People v. Goff, 100 Cal. App.2d 166, 223 P.2d 27 (1950); Smith v. State,
74 Ga. App. 777, 41 S.E.2d 541 (1947) cert. denied, 332 U.S. 771 (1947); 3 WIGMORE § 770
and cases cited at 157-160.
118. 171 Eng. Rep. 408 (K.B. 1815).
119. 3 WIGMORE § 770 at 157 n. 1.
120. Towns v. Alford, 2 Ala. 378, 381 (1841) quoted by WiGmORE in § 770 at 157 n.1.
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The real danger to which the objection is addressed is that
of improper collusion between counsel and the witness. The attempt to plant a false memory or false facts in the testimony is
regarded by some as the only valid basis for the leading question
objection. 121 This is very serious business indeed and vastly tran122
scends the more traditional emphasis on the merely suggestive.
In oral examinations much more than the bare question itself is
often needed to determine if the danger is present. The verbal
form of the question, the nature of the topic, the temper and bias
of the witness, the tone, inflection and emphais of the question
are all important considerations in making a judgment. 12 3
The danger here boils down not to undue suggestability as
some claim'2 4 but rather to perjury. 25 Seen in this light an objection to a question because it is leading will not serve either to
prevent perjury or to uncover it. 121 Whether suggestability or perjury or both are the concern, the only devices which will serve are
an expanded opportunity for cross-examination and the imposition of traditional criminal penalties where necessary.
Written narrative testimony gives a far better opportunity
for the preparation of incisive cross-examination than any other
mode of direct presentation. If collusion between counsel and the
witness has existed to place misinformation in the record, crossexamination' 27 following an extended period of study of the direct,
and after a voir dire as to the statements made therein, is the best
device we have to uncover it.
The problem comes down to one of legal ethics.' 21 Collusion
121. APPELTON, EVIDENCE 227 (1860); CHTrY, 3 PRACTICE OF THE LAW 892 (1835); 3
WIGMORE § 769 at 654, § 770 at 162.
122. ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE TO RULE 611(c), PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES;

MCCORMICK § 6; E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE at 57 (1954).
123. J. McGumE, et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE at 232 and cases cited (5th
ed. 1965).
124. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE at 57 (1954); McCoRMICK § 6.
125. 3 WIGMORE §§ 769, 770.
126. This is the case regardless of the form in which the evidence is presented.
127. Professor Morgan, in an aside, states that written testimony will not only destroy
the leading question objection but will also hamper cross. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 58 (1954). The first observation is obviously true, the second is gratuitous and
just as patently false.
128. The direct participation of counsel will have a number of salutary effects. It will
remove the fiction that lawyers do not prepare their witnesses prior to the trial. Counsel
will be required to engage in greater and more careful preparation than generally is the
case today and will have a greater responsibility for that which is presented in the courtroom. The employed expert will work more closely with counsel and will necessarily pay
far greater attention to his task than is the practice currently. A primary cause of poor
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as used here does not mean that counsel has written or edited or
prepared his witness' testimony. We do that now. Rather, it is the
deliberate attempt to falsify, to engage in felonious conduct, in
the cause of the client.129 The procedure outlined here will go
much further toward solving this problem than any we now have
available in the courtroom.
VII.

DIscovERY

Where the witness is one who will testify as to complex facts,
his testimony can be discovered prior to the trial through the use
of ordinary discovery machinery. However, where the witness is
a qualified expert many state and some federal courts have been
loath to grant extensive pre-trial examination. 0
The provisions of the proposal, which require that testimony
be made available prior to the trial, may be resisted as transgressing procedures in those jurisdictions which do not ordinarily permit wide pre-trial discovery of experts. It must be noted at the
outset, however, that the exchange of testimony contemplated
here is not discovery at all. The exchange would take place after
the expert has completed his tasks and formulated his testimony.
It is the trial testimony itself that is exchanged. This phase of the
proceedings must be considered a portion of the trial itself. Nevertheless, some will persist in labelling the exchange a discovery
device. Even if that be accepted arguendo, public policy requires
the implementation of the suggested proceedure.
Objections to disclosure of expert reports are made generally
on the grounds that such discovery invades the domain of the
attorney's work-product,13' gives the opposing party an undue
preparation of experts and lawyers is an economic one. Close cooperation and a substantial
study of the subject matter at issue tend to raise fees beyond that which the client may

wish to pay. The proposal may exacerbate this particular difficulty, but will insure that
counsel and his witness will be better prepared if at higher cost.
129. Though some have counselled that under certain circumstances it may be that
an attorney should go all the way for his client, the idea is repugnant to our system of
jurisprudence. Moreover, it would glorify the same means and ends logic that tragically
led a number of "loyal" attorneys of some prominence to their downfall in connection with
Watergate.

130. Even revised Rule 26(b)(4) FED. R. Civ. P. sets some limits on discovery of expert
witnesses. See also J. Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure,28 F.R.D. 111 (1965); F. Winner, ProceduralMethods to Attain Discovery, 28
F.R.D. 97 (1961); C. Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39 (1963). Some of the problems raised

by these commentators have been remedied by the revision of Rule 26. See note 140 infra.
See also N.Y. CPLR § 3101(d) (McKinney 1970).
131. United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954); Colonial
Airlines, Inc. v. Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Schuyler v. United Air Lines, 10
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advantage by allowing it to take a property right in the expert's
testimony which has been purchased and paid for,'32 and would
permit invasion of the diligent preparation of the case.'33 Similarly, some older decisions contended that discovery procedures
did not apply to expert testimony 34 and if they did at all, good
cause had to be shown before discovery would be permitted. 3 ' To
allow discovery, it has been said, "would penalize the diligent and
36
place a premium on laziness.'
The proposal contemplates no "invasion" of the experts'
domain or the lawyer's work-product. It merely advances re3 The proquired disclosure at trial to a slightly earlier period."
posal puts a premium on clarity of direct presentation and on
expanded opportunity for cross, both matters tending to advance
the announced policy of mutuality of disclosure 3 and to inhibit
39
secrecy and undue game playing by counsel.
F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950); J. MOORE, 4 FEDERAL PRAICE § 26.66 (1972).
132. Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petrol. Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb.
1959); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947);
see J. MOORE, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.66 (1972).
133. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940); E.
I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959); U.S.
v. Five Cases, etc., 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950); Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941).
134. United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955); Henlopen
Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 33 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1963); United States v. 284,392
Square Feet, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. N.Y. 1962).
135. United Airlines v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960); Midland Steel
Products Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 7 F.R.D. 132 (W.D. Mich. 1945); U.S. v. Five Cases,
9 F.R.D. 81 (D. Conn. 1949); U.S. v. 6.82 Acres, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D. N.M. 1955). The
requirement of good cause has been removed from FED. R. Civ. P. 34 and a new requirement of a special showing has been added in Rule 26 as part of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) with
regard to experts hired for litigation but not expected to testify. The proposal does not
contemplate this type of expert.
136. McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D. N.Y. 1939) aff'd, 113 F.2d 721
(2d Cir. 1940) cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940).
137. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Dresser Indus. Inc. v. Doyle,
40 F.R.D. 478 (N.D. 1ll. 1966); United States v. 38 Cases etc., 35 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Pa.
1964) appeal dismissed, 369 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. 50.34 Acres, 13
F.R.D. 19 (E.D. N.Y. 1952); Leding v. United States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont.
1959); United States v. 300 Cans, 7 F.R.D. 36 (N.D. Ohio 1946); Bergstrom Paper Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wisc. 1947).
138. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66
(9th Cir. 1968); United States v. 2,001.10 Acres, 48 F.R.D. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1969); United
States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. 48
Jars, More or Less, 23 F.R.D. 192 (D. D.C. 1958). See also Long, supranote 130; J. MOORE,
4 FEDERAL PRACTCE § 26.66(1) at 26-470 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(1); 7 Cyc. FED. Pao,
§ 25.703 (3d ed. 1951).
139. Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958); South-
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly contemplates
substantial discovery of expert testimony."' Moreover, many
courts rejected the objections to such discovery even before the
1971 changes in Rule 26. Discovery of expert testimony has been
held to be within the sound discretion of the trial court."' Exercising that discretion, the courts have rejected objections to disclosure based upon work product,4 2 alleged property rights' and
diligence of counsel.'
Where the testimony of the adverse expert is to be offered at
trial,'41 some courts have held that it may be compelled earlier.'
Moreover, it has been recognized, albeit slowly, that the need for
preparation of adequate cross-examination is in itself sufficient
grounds for granting discovery.'47
ern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Products Corp.,
41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966); Clevite Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 257 F. Supp.
50 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
140. Thus, FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(4) now deals specifically with discovery of experts.
Pursuant to its provisions, discovery may be obtained by interrogatory to identify experts
the opposition expects to call at trial and obtain a statement as to subject matter, substance of the facts and opinions in that testimony, as well as a summary of the grounds
for each opinion held, Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), the court upon
motion may grant further discovery and under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) may extend discovery to
experts not expected to be called as witnesses.
The FEDERAL RuLEs OF CmUNAL PROCEDURE are broader still. Under Rule 16 (a)(2)
the defendant may have discovery of the "results or reports" of physical and mental
examinations and of scientific tests or experiments.
141. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Francisco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1966); Benning v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Tiedman v. American Pigment
Corp., 253 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1958); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v.
Hayden, 231 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1956).
142. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174
(5th Cir. 1967); Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Long, supra note 130; Report of
Comm. on Rules of Practice& Procedureof the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 43 F.R.D.
211, 238 (1967).
143. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); United States
v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D.
1 (D. Colo. 1966); P. LoUisELL, MODERN CALioRNiA DiscovERY, § 11.04 at 332 (1963).
144. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. 23.76 Acres,
32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963); Long, supra note 130; Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an
Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 485, 487-88 (1962).
145. indeed, at least one court has held that in some circumstances, the adverse
expert testimony can be compelled even where the proponent did not wish it offered at
trial. Thomaston v. Ives, 239 A.2d 515 (Conn., 1968); noted in 73 DiCouNSON L. REv. 675
(1968).
146. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio
1947); Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v.
48 Jars, More or Less, 23 F.R.D. 192 (D. D.C. 1958); Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D.
237 (D. R.I. 1957); United States v. 50.34 Acres, 12 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
147. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. 23.76 Acres,
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The barriers to discovery of expert testimony have been very
slow to come down. This has been caused by a misplaced emphasis on the traditions of the adversary process and too little emphasis on the overall public policies involved in securing the speedy,
just, and inexpensive resolution of disputes.
In United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land,'48 Judge Winter
rejected all the usual objections to discovery and concluded:
The basic purpose of discovery is to prevent confusion, and it
does not appear to me how full discovery, even discovery of an
opinion of ultimate value, if permitted, could possibly result in
confusion. It is the rare law suit in which there are not at least
two versions of a single transaction or occurrence. The purpose
of discovery is to permit each party to learn of the other party's
version. That the versions may conflict creates a question for the
trier of the fact, but hardly creates a basis to refuse discovery.'
It is to be noted. . . that one of the express uses of despositions is that of cross-examination, [Rule 32(a)(1)] and it needs
no citation of authority to say that an expert is the most difficult
witness to cross-examine, particularly if one is unaware until
trial of the substance of his testimony.'
CONCLUSION

Judge Winter's reasoning applies with equal force in support
of the present proposal. Although the proposal does not seek to
alter discovery rules because it is not technically a discovery device, it does seek to make the public policy behind them fully
operative.' 5' Since we reject artificial objections to discovery and
seek to disseminate the facts to all parties prior to trial, one can
only speculate as to why we countenance artificial barriers to fact
finding at the trial. That speculation in part centers on the attitude of the bar toward the trial process itself. So long as some
lawyers treat trial practice as combat, the vice of obfuscation will
seem to them to be a virtue. In this view, tactics rather than
substance occupy counsel's energies, and the purpose of the
32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963); United States v. 62.50 Acres, 23 F.R.D. 287 (N.D. Ohio
1959). See Advisory Committee's Note to proposed changes in FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 26,
ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil ProcedureRelating to Discovery, 48
F.R.D. 487 at 497 (1969). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1).
148. United States v. 23.76 Acres, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
149. Id. at 596.
150. Id.
151. See MODEL CODE, COMMENT TO RULE 406 at 209.
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trial-the just resolution of the particular dispute-is lost. To the
vast majority of the trial bar, however, the true virtue is clarity
of presentation coupled with skilled advocacy. The proposal advanced in these pages is intended to reduce obfuscation and the
emphasis on tactical advantage so that through clarity and advocacy, the trier of the fact may have a better opportunity to reach
a just result.
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